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[L.A. No. 27674. In Bank. April 21, 1964.] 
CHESTER M. VANDERMARK et al., Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al., Defendants 
and Respondents. 
[1] Products Liability-Evidence.-In an action against an auto-
mobile manufacturer and an automobile retailer for injuries 
sustained in an accident allegedly caused by the sudden failure 
of the automobile's braking system, it was error to strike an 
expert's testimony as to the possible causes of the braking 
system's failure and to reject plaintiffs' offer to prove that all 
of the possible causes were attributable to defendants, par-
ticularly where damage to the ear precluded determining 
whether or not the brake master cylinder assembly had heen 
properly installed and adjusted before the accident. 
[2] Id.-Strict Liability of Manufacturer.-A manufacturer is 
strictly liable in tort when he places an article on the market 
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects 
and the article proves to have a defect that causes injury to a 
human being; such liability, being strict, encompasses defects 
regardless of their source, and therefore a manufacturer of a 
completed product cannot escape liability by tracing the defect 
to a component part supplied by another. 
[3] Id.-Strict Liability of Manufacturer.-The rules relating to 
strict liability of It manufacturer for injuries caused by a 
defective completed product focus responsibility for defects, 
whether negligently or nonnegligently caused, on the manu-
facturer of the completed product, and they apply regardless 
[2] Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by auto-
mobile or other vehicle, aircraft, boat, or their parts, supplies, and 
equipment, note, 78 AL.R.2d 460. See also Am.J'ur.2d, Automobiles 
and Highway Traffic, § 646; Am.Jur., Sales (1st ed § 799). 
Melt. Dig. References: [1-5,7-11] Products Liability; [6] Negli-
gence, § 111(8). 
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of what part of the manufacturing process the manufaeturer 
chooses to delegate to third parties. 
14] Id.-Strict Liabiliq of K&nufacturer.-An automobile manu-
facturer who delivers ears to its dealers that are not ready 
to be driveu away by the ultimate purchasers but relies on 
its dealers to make the final inspections, corrections, and ad-
justments necessary to make the ears ready for use cannot 
delegate its duty to have its ears delivered to the ultimate 
consumer free from dangerous defects, and. thus it cannot 
escape liability on the ground that a defect in a particular 
car may have been caused by something one of its authorized I 
dealers did or failed to do. .. 
[5] ld.-Strict Liablliq of Kanufacturer-N'onauit.-In All &e-
tion against an automobile manufacturer for injuries sustained 
in an accident allegedly caused by the sudden failure of the 
automobile's braking system, it '\\'as error to grant a nonsuit : 
on causes of aetion based on strict liability where plaintiffs I 
introduced or offered substantial evidence that they were in-
jured as a result of a defect that was present in the car when 
the manufacturer's authorized dealer delivered it to plaintiff 
driver. 
(6] N'egligence-'1'rial-N'oDSuit.-In an action against an auto-
mobile manufacturer for injuries sustained in an aecident al-
legedly caused by the sudden failure of the automobile's brak-
ing system, it was error to grant a nonsuit on causes of action 
based on negligence where plaintiffs introduced or offered sub-
stantial evidence that tbe defect was caused by some negligent 
conduct for which the manufacturer was responsible. 
[7] Products Liabiliq-Strict Liablliq of Retailer .-Retailers, 
like manufacturers, are engaged in the business of distributing 
goods to the public and are an integral part of the overall 
producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost 
of injuries from defective products. 
[8] ld.-Strict Liability of Retailer.-A. a retailer engaged in the 
business of distributing goods to the public, an automobile 
dealer is strictly liable in tort for personal injuries caused by 
defects in cars sold by it. 
[9] Id.-8trict Liabiliq of Retailer.-In an action against an 
automobile retailer for injuries sustained in an accident al-
legedlyeaused by the SUdden failure of the automobile's 
braking ~ystelll, it was immaterial that defendant restricted 
its contractual liability to ,the purchaser of the car, since it 
was strictly liable in tort. I 
110] Id.-Strict Liabiliq of Retailer.-The requirement of timely 
notice of breach of warranty (Civ. Code, § 1769) is not ap-
plicable to the strict tort liability of an automobile dealer 
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[11] Id.-Strict Liability of Retailer-Directed Verdict.-In an 
action against an automobile retailer for injuries sustained in 
an accident allegedly caused by the sudden failure of the 
automobile's braking system, although plaintiffs sought to im-
pose strict liability on the retailer on the theory of sales-act 
warranties which allegedly were not applicable due to a dis-
claimer in the retailer's contract with the purchaser of the 
car and failure to give timely notice of breach of warranty, it 
was error to direct a verdict for the retailer where plaintiffs 
pleaded and introduced substantial evidence of all of the facts 
necessary to establish strict liability in tort. 
APPEAL from judgmentc:; of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Arthur Crum, Judge. One judgment 
affirmed in part and reversed in part; other judgment re-
versed. 
Action for personal injuries sustained by plaintiffs in an 
automobile accident allegedly caused by the sudden failure of 
the car's braking system. Judgment of nonsuit in favor of 
defen~ant automobile manufacturer reversed; judgment for 
defendant automobile dealer affirmed in part and reversed in 
part. 
Edward L. Lascher and Donald C. Lozano for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants. 
Eugene P. Fay, Edward I. Pollock and Pollock, Pollock & 
Fay as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
Dryden, Harrington, Horgan & Swartz, Vernon G. Foster, 
Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Gerold C. Dunn and Henry F. Walker 
for Defendants and Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In October 1958 plaintiff Chester Vander-
mark bought a new Ford automobile from defendant Lorimer 
Diesel Engine Company, an authorized Ford dealer doing 
business as Maywood Bell Ford. About six weeks later, while • 
driving on the San Bernardino Freeway, he lost control of 
the car. It went off the highway to the right and collided with 
a light post. He and his sister, plaintiff Mary Tresham, suffer-
ed serious injuries. They brought this action for damages 
against Maywood Bell Ford and the Ford Motor Company, 
which manufactured and assembled the car. They pleaded 
causes of action for breach of warranty and negligence. The 
trial court granted Ford's motion for a nonsuit on aU causes 
. of action and directed a verdict in favor of Maywood Bell on. 
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the warranty causes of action. The jury returned a verdict 
for Maywood Bell on the negligence causes of action, and the 
trial court entered judgment on the verdict. Plaintiffs appeal. 
Vandermark had driven the car approximately 1,500 miles 
before the accident. He used it primarily in town, but drove 
it on two occasions from his home in Huntington Park to 
Joshua Tree in San Bernardino County. He testified that the 
car operated normally before the accident except once when 
he was driving home from Joshua Tree. He was in the left-
hand westbound lane of the San Bernardino Freeway 
when traffic ahead slowed. He applied the brakes and the 
car "started to make a little dive to the right and con-
tinued on across the two lanes of traffic till she hit the 
shoulder. Whatever it was then let go and I was able 
to then pull her back into the road. " He drove. home 
without further difficulty, but before using the car again, he 
took it to Maywood Bell for the regular 1,000-mile new car 
servicing. He testified that he described the freeway incident 
to Maywood Bell's service attendant, but Maywood Bell's 
records do not indicate that any complaint was made. 
After the car was serviced, Vandermark drove it in town 
on short trips totaling approximately 300 miles. He and his 
sister then set out on another trip to Joshua Tree. He testi-
fied that while driving in the right-hand lane of the freeway 
at about 45 to 50 miles per hour, "the car started to make a 
little shimmy or weave and started pulling to the right. . .. I 
tried to pull back, but it didn't seem to come, so I applied 
my brakes gently to see if I could straighten her up, but I 
couldn't seem to pull her back to the left. So, I let off on the 
brakes and she continued to the right, and I tried again to 
put on the brakes and she wouldn't come back, and all of a 
sudden this pole was in fro:r;tt of me and we smashed into 
it. " Plaintiff Tresham testi:6~d to a substantially similar 
version of the accideD~. A witness for plaintiffs, who was 
driving about 200 feet behind them, testified that plaintiffs' 
car was in the right-hand lane when he saw its taillights 
come on. The car started to swerve and finally skidded into 
the light post. An investigating officer testified that there 
were skid marks leading from the highway to the car. 
Plaintiffs called an expert on the 0peration of hydraulic 
automobile brakes. In answer to hypothetical questions based 
on evidence in the record and his own knowledge of the brak-
ing system of the car, the expert testified as to the cause of 
the accident. It was his opinion that the brakes applied them-
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selves owing to a fai1ure of the piston in the master cylinder 
to retract far enough when the brake pedal was released to 
uncover a bypass port through which hydraulic fluid should 
have been able to escape into a reservoir above the mas-
ter cylinder. Failure of the piston to uncover the bypass 
port led to a closed system and a partial application of th(> 
brakes, whic)l in turn led to heating that expanded the brake 
fluid until the brakes applied themselves with such force that 
Vandermark lost control of the car. The expert also testified 
that the failure of the piston to retract sufficiently to uncover 
the bypass port could have been caused by dirt in the master 
cylinder, a defective or wrong-sized part, distortion of the 
firewall, or improper assembly or adjustment. [1] The 
trial court struck the testimony of the possible causes of the 
failure of the piston to retract, on the ground that there was 
no direct evidence that anyone or more of the causes exist(>d, 
and it rej(>cted plaintiffs offer to prove that all of the possible 
causes were attributable to defendants. These rulings were 
erroneous, for plaintiffs were entitled to establish the exist-
ence of a defect and defendants' r(>sponsibility therefor by 
circumstantial evidence, particularly when, as in this case, 
the damage to the car in the collision precluded determining 
whether or not the master cylinder assembly had been prop-
erly installed and adjusted before the accident. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of reviewhlg the nonsuit in 
favor of Ford and the directed verdict in favor of Maywood 
Bell on the warranty causes of action, it must be taken as 
<,stablished that wIlen the car was delivered to Vandermark, 
the master cylinder assembly had a defect that caused the 
accident. Moreover, since it could reasonably be inferred 
from the description of the braking system in evidence and 
the offer of proof of all possible causes of defects that tIle 
defect was owing to negligence in design, manufacture, as-
sembly, or adjustment, it must be taken as established that 
the defect was caused by some such negligence. 
Ford contends, however, that it may not be held liable for 
negligence in manufacturing the car or strictly liable in tort 
for placing it on the market without proof that the car was 
defective when Ford relin~uished control over it. Ford point"! 
out that in this case the car passed through two oth(>r au-
tllOrized Ford dealers before it was sold to Maywood Bell and 
that Maywood Bell removed the power steering unit before 
!!e1ling the car to Vandermark. 
[2] In G,oeenman v. rllba PoU'er Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 
2d 57, 62 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697,377 P.2d 897J, we held that "A 
) 
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mallufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he 
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without 
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes 
injury to a human being." Since the liability is strict 
it encompasses defects regardless of their source, and there-
fore a manufacturer of a completed product cannot escape 
liability by tracing the defect to a component part supplied 
by another. (GoZdberg v. KoZlsman Instrument Corp., 12 
N.Y.2d432,437 [240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81].) More-
over, even before such strict liability was recognized, the 
manufacturer of a completed product ,vas subject· to vicar-
ious Jiability for the nE'gligence of his suppliers or subcon-
tractors that resulted in defects in the completed product. 
(Dow v. Holly Manufacturing Co., 49 Ca1.2d 720,·726-727 
{321 P.2d 736]; Ford Motor Co. v. Matkis, 322 F.2d 267, 
273; Boeing A.irpZane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 313; see 
Rest., Torts, § 400.) [3] These rules focus responsibility 
for defects, whether negligently or non negligently caused, on 
the manufacture,r ·of tlle completed product, and they apply 
regardless of what part of the manufacturing process the 
manufacturer chooses to delegate to third parties. [4] It ap-
pears in the present case that Ford delegates the final steps 
in that process to its authorized dealers. It does not deliver 
cars to its dealers that are ready to be driven away by the 
ultimate purchasers but relies on its dealers to make the final 
inspections, corrections, and adjustments necessary to make 
the cars ready for use. Since Ford, as the manufacturer of 
the completed product, cannot delegate its duty to have its 
cars delivered to the ultimate purchaser free from dangerous 
defects, it cannot escape liability on the ground that the 
defect in Vandermark's car may ha,-e been causE'd. by some-
thing one of its authorized dealers did or failed to do. 
[5] Since plaintiffs introduced or offered substantial evi-
dence that they were injured as a result of a defect that was 
present in the car when Ford's authorized dealer delivered it 
to Vandermark, the trial court erred in granting a nonsuit on 
the causes of action by which plaintiffs sought to establis]l 
that Ford was strictly liable to them. [6] Since plaintiffs 
also introduced or offered substantial evidence that the defect 
was caused by some negligent conduct for which Ford was 
responsible, the trial court also erred in granting a nonsuit 
on the causes of action by which plaintiffs sought to establish 
that Ford was liable for negligence. I 
Plaintiffs contend that Maywood Bell is also strictly liable 
) 
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in tort for the injuries caused by the defect in the car and 
that therefore the trial court erred in directing a verdict 
for Maywood Bell on the warranty causes of action. May-
wood Bell contends that the rule of strict liability in the 
Greenman case applies only to actions against manufacturers 
brought by injured parties with whom the manufacturers did 
not deal. It contends t11at it validly disclaimed warranty 
liability for personal injuriE's in its contract with Vander-
markl (see Civ. Code, § 1791 j Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 
42 Ca1.2d 682, 693 [268 P.2d 1041]), and that in any event 
neitller plaintiff gave it timely notice of breach of warranty. 
(Civ. Code § 1769.) 
[7] Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the busi-
ness of distributing goods to the public. They are an integral 
part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that 
should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defE'ctive prod-
uct'). (See Greenman v. Y1lba Power Prodl/cis, Inc., 59 Cal. 
2d 57, 63 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897].) In some cases 
the retailer may be the only member of that enterprise rea-
sonably available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the 
retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that 
the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure 
on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer's strict liabil-
ity thus serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict liabil-
ity on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum 
protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to 
IThe wuranty clause of the contract provided: "Dealer warrants to 
Purchaser (except as hereinafter provided) each part of each Ford 
Motor Comp8llY product Bold by Dealer to Purchaser to be free under 
normal use and service from defeets in material and workmanship for a 
period of ninety (90) days from the date of delivery of such product to 
Purchaser, or until such product has been driven, used or operated for n 
distance of four thousand (4,000) miles, whichever event first shall 
occur. Dealer makes no waTTllnty whatsocv('r with respect to tires or 
tubes. Dealer's obligation under this warranty is limited to replacement, 
without charge to Purchaser, of such parts as shall be returned to 
Dealer and as shall be acknowledged by Dealer to be defective. This 
warranty shall not apply to any Ford Motor Company product that lUIS 
been subject to misuse, negligence, or accident, or in which parts Dot 
made or supplted by Ford Motor Company shall haTe been used if, in 
the determination of Dealer, such use shall have affected its perform· 
anee, stability, or reliability, or .hich shall have been altered or reo 
paired outside of Dealer's place of business in a manner which, in the 
determination of Dealer, shall have affeeted its performance. stability, 
or reliability. This warranty is expressly in lieu of all other warranties, 
express or implied, and of all other obligatiolls on the part of Dealer." 
) 
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the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protec-
tion between them in the course of their continuing business 
relationship. [8] Accordingly, as a retailer engaged in the 
business of distributing goods to the public, Maywood Bell is 
strictly liable in tort for personal injuries caused by defects 
in cars sold by it. (See Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 
200 [213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 173 N.E.2d 773] ; McBurnette v. Play-
ground Equipment Corp. (Fla.) 137 So.2d 563, 566-567; 
Graham v. Butterfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68 [269 P.2d 413, 
418) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,406 
[161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1]; State Farm Mut. AlIto. Ins. 
Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 25~ Iowa 1289 [110 N.W.2d 449, 
455-456] ; Rest.2d Torts (Tent. Draft No.7) § 402A, com. f.) 
[9] Since Maywood Bell is strictly liable in tort, the fact 
that it restricted its contractual liability to Vandermark is 
immaterial. Regardless of the obligations it assumed by con-
tract, it is subject to strict liability in tort because it is in the 
business of selling automobiles, one of which proved to be 
defective and caused injury to human beings. [10] The 
requirement of timely notice of breach of warranty (Civ. 
Code, § 1769) is not applicable to such tort liability just as it 
is not applicable to tort liability based on negligence (Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 60-62 [27 
Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897] ; see Rest.2d Torts (Tent. Draft 
No.7) § 402A, com. m). Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Ca1.2d 826 
[193 P.2d 1], and Vogel v. Thrifty Drug Co., 43 Ca1.2d 184 
[272 P.2d 1], on which Maywood Bell relies, dealt only with 
warranties arising under the uniform sales act (Civ. Code, 
§§ 1721-1800); neither of them considered the question 
whether the defendant might be subject to strict tort liability 
not arising under that act. 
[11] Although plaintiffs sought to impose strict liability 
on Maywood Bell on the theory of sales-act warranties, they 
pleaded and introduced substantial evidence of all of the 
facts necessary to establish strict liability in tort. Accordingly, 
the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Maywood Bell 
on the so-called warranty causes of action. 
Plaintiffs contend finally that v~rious prejudicial errors 
were committed in presenting the negligence causes of action 
to the jury and that therefore the judgment in favor of May-
wood Bell on those causes of action should be reversed. The 
issue of Maywood Bell's liability for negligence was fully 
litigated. Although the evidence was in sharp conflict, we are 
convinced from an exa.mination of tlle record that no prej-
) 
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udicial error occurred in presenting the negligence causes 
of action to the jury. 
The judgment of nonsuit in favor of Ford Motor Company 
is reversed. The judgment in favor of Maywood Bell Ford on 
the negligence causes of action is affirmed and in all other 
respects the judgment in favor of Maywood Bell Ford is 
reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobri~ 
ner, J., and Peek, J., concurred. 
